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LINDA A. MALONE*
THE LEGAL DILEMMA OF GUANTA´NAMO DETAINEES
FROM BUSH TO OBAMA
ABSTRACT. The stage for the Guanta´namo detainees’ commission proceedings
was set by the interplay between the Executive’s detention powers and the Judiciary’s
habeas powers. The Bush administration turned to Congress to provide less than
what was required by the court, instead of the minimum deemed necessary to comply
with each decision, or to explore another legal argument for not complying. This
article examines how the law for the Guanta´namo detainees has been shaped by the
US courts and by Congress. The article begins by observing the guidelines issued by
the Supreme Court for compliance with the constitutional and humanitarian law
requirements, and the status of the law which set the stage for the landmark decision
in Boumediene v. Bush. It then turns to the line of cases in the D.C. Circuit that have
deﬁned the parameters of habeas proceedings and further examines President
Obama’s 2011 Order and the review procedure it set for the Guanta´namo Bay
detainees. The article concludes with a reﬂection on the torture policy of the Bush
administration and the future of military commissions.
I THE STATUS OF THE LAW BEFORE BOUMEDINE
V. BUSH, AND WHERE THE SUPREME COURT’S
COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HUMANITARIAN LAW REQUIREMENTS
STAND TODAY
In the heated debate over Attorney General Eric Holder’s announce-
ment that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a member of Al-Qaeda alleg-
edly responsible for the 9/11 attacks on theWorld Trade Center, would
be tried at a Guanta´namomilitary commission, Americans, whether in
w Director of the Human Security Law Center, Marshall-Wythe Foundation
Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. The author can be reached at
lamalo@wm.edu.
Criminal Law Forum (2012) 23:347–362  Springer 2012
DOI 10.1007/s10609-012-9184-2
favor of, or opposed to the decision, seem to be suﬀering from col-
lective amnesia concerning how this decision came to pass. Moham-
med’s commission proceeding took place 11 years after 9/11,1 for two
reasons. The Bush administration unnecessarily, immorally, and ille-
gally engaged in the torture of the worst perpetrators of terrorist acts,
and the Bush administration repeatedly chose to advance its theory of
an all-powerful executive branch at the expense of prosecuting these
perpetrators expeditiously, against the urging of the most experienced
and knowledgeable military legal advisors. That torture, however
narrowly and self-servingly deﬁned, was committed and has been
acknowledged by President Bush himself.2 That the supremacy of the
executive power was a top priority over these prosecutions and other
critical areas of national decision-making has been acknowledged by
President Bush and many of his advisors. The second reason for
11 years of delay has as justiﬁcation only a political agenda to establish
the supremacy of the executive branch over the legislative and judicial
branches. Whatever minimal guidance the Supreme Court provided
in the process for the detainees in the decisions of Rasul v. Bush,3
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,4 and Boumediene v. Bush,5 was rejected by the
Bush administration. Each time the administration turned to a coop-
erative Congress—not to provide even theminimum deemed necessary
to comply with each decision, but to provide less than what was
required by the Court or explore another legal argument for not
complying. If the administration after Hamdi6 in 2004, and certainly
afterHamdan in 2006, had declared that the commissions would utilize
1 The arraignment took place in May 2012 and the trial is tentatively scheduled for
May 2013. M. Warner, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Makes First Court Appearance
in 3 Years’ (PBS NewsHour, 7 May 2012) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/
jan-june12/guantanamo1_05-07.html accessed 14 June 2012; C. McGreal, 9/11
Suspect Refuses to Answer Judge’s Questions as Guantanamo Trial Opens’
(The Guardian, London, 5 May 2012) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
may/05/9-11-suspects-guantanamo-trial accessed 14 June 2012.
A 2009 presentation of this paper at the Centro Studi Americani in Rome appears
in the 2012 edition of RSA, the journal of the Italian Association of American
Studies.
2 P. Owen, George Bush Admits U.S. Waterboarded 9/11 Mastermind’
(The Guardian, London, 3 June 2010) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/03/
george-bush-us-waterboarded-terror-mastermind accessed 22 May 2012.
3 Rasul v. Bush, 542 US 466 (2004), discussed below, text to n 7.
4 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (2006), discussed below, text to n 8–9.
5 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US 723 (2008), discussed below, text to n 10–15.
6 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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the long established Uniform Code of Military Justice (again, as the
most experienced and knowledgeable military law experts advocated)
justice could have proceeded. Instead, courageousmilitary and civilian
lawyers seeking to compel compliance with each prior phase of Su-
preme Court guidance on constitutional and humanitarian law were
accused of delaying the commissions and the justice for victims.
In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that the United States
had suﬃcient jurisdiction and control over Guanta´namo Bay under
the federal habeas statute for habeas to be available to detainees to
challenge their detention as a statutory matter. After Rasul, President
Bush, by executive order, established Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (‘CSRTs’) to evaluate whether or not a detainee is an
enemy combatant’, with military commissions to conduct war crime
trials of unlawful enemy combatants’.7
In 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that these
military commissions, as established by the executive branch, were in-
valid because they were not in compliance with requirements of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions.8
Working with a cooperative Congress, President Bush, in the 2006
Military Commissions Act (‘MCA’), re-established the military com-
missions with congressional authorization and expanded procedures,
but also stripped the federal courts of habeas review for broadly deﬁned
unlawful enemy combatants (beyond just Guanta´namo Bay detainees).
The 2006 MCA sanctioned the use of coerced testimony before the
military commissions, authorized non-Department of Defense interro-
gators to use enhanced interrogation techniques so long as they did not
shock the conscience,’ and granted immunity for those who had sanc-
tionedor engaged in commonarticle 3 outrages uponpersonal dignity’.9
The habeas-stripping’ provisions of the 2006 MCA reached
the Supreme Court in 2008, which came to a 5-4 decision with the
majority opinion by Justice Kennedy and dissents from Justices
Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts.10 In Boumediene
v. Bush, ﬁve of the Justices concluded that Congress did not have the
constitutional authority to suspend habeas corpus for detainees, ren-
7 P. Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Order Establishing Combatant
Status Review Tribunal’ (Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, 7 July 2004)
www.defense.gov/news/jul2004/d20040707review.pdf accessed 22 May 2012.
8 See Hamdan (n 4 above).
9 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948, 120 Stat. 2607
(2006).
10 Boumediene (n 5 above).
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dering Section 7 of the 2006 MCA unconstitutional because no sus-
pension was allowed unless, in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it’.11 Additionally, suspension of habeaswas
not otherwise permissible because the Commission Status Review
Tribunal procedureswere not an adequate substitute for habeas review.
Dissenting Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the majority
should not have even reached the second issue, but should have
remanded to the lower court to determine if the CSRT procedures
were an adequate substitute’ for habeas review.12 Justice Scalia,
writing for all dissenters, argued that habeas review did not extend to
aliens seized and held outside the United States.13
In this landmark 2008 decision of Boumediene, the Supreme Court
thus held that the US Naval Base at Guanta´namo Bay, Cuba, was
subject to the full eﬀect’ of the Suspension Clause of the United
States Constitution, and that Section 7 of the MCA, which stripped
federal courts of their jurisdiction to consider Guanta´namo detainees’
habeas petitions, eﬀects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ’.14
Accordingly, the alien detainees held by the executive branch at
Guanta´namo after their capture were entitled to invoke the funda-
mental procedural protections of habeas corpus’.15 With the extension
of federal court jurisdiction to Guanta´namo detainees’ habeas peti-
tions, district courts in the District of Columbia Circuit began to:
(1) vacate their prior dismissals of such habeas petitions that relied on
MCA’s Section 7 as required by the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Boumediene; or (2) revive detainees’ habeas petitions that were stayed
until the decision in Boumediene was handed down in June 2008.
The decision left many critical questions unresolved. The Supreme
Court did not decide:
(i) The statutory or constitutional validity of the CSRT procedure;
(ii) The statutory or constitutional validity of military commissions
as set up under the Military Commissions Act of 2006, or their
compliance with the Geneva Conventions;
(iii) What must be demonstrated by the government or the detainee
at a habeas proceeding; or
11 Ibid., 724 (citing U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2).
12 Ibid., 802.
13 Ibid., 827.
14 Ibid., 728.
15 Ibid., 798.
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(iv) What procedures are necessary to satisfy the due process
requirements for habeas review.
Yet, President Obama signed another Military Commissions Act
into law on October 28, 2009. Under this act:
(i) A military judge presides over commission proceedings;
(ii) The President must approve executions;
(iii) Appeals are permitted to the Military Commissions Court of
Review, the District of Columbia Circuit Court, and ultimately
the Supreme Court;
(iv) The military judges have jurisdiction over 32 crimes, including
conspiracy, terrorism, and material support of terrorism; and
(v) Defendants are guaranteed counsel.16
The term alien illegal enemy combatant’ in the 2006 Act was
changed to unprivileged enemy belligerents’ (‘UEBs’), who are
deﬁned as persons who either:
(i) Engaged in hostilities against the United States;
(ii) Purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States; or
(iii) Were part of Al Qaeda at the time of the alleged oﬀense.17
Only alien UEBs are subject to military commissions. Hearsay
evidence is still admissible, but is much more restricted than under the
2006 MCA, and statements obtained by torture are excluded: No
statement obtained by the use of torture or by cruel, or inhuman
treatment, or degrading treatment […] shall be admissible in a mili-
tary commission under this chapter’.18
Self-incrimination is also prohibited, as no one is required to
testify against himself/herself.19 More generally, a statement of the
accused may be admitted only if the military judge ﬁnds that it is
reliable and authentically voluntary.20 The accused can present evi-
dence in his defense, and examine and respond to all evidence
admitted on the issue of guilt or innocence and on sentencing.21
16 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub L 111-84, § 950, 123 Stat 2190 (2009).
17 Ibid., § 948(a).
18 Ibid., § 948(r).
19 Ibid., § 948(b).
20 Ibid., § 948(r).
21 Ibid., § 949(a).
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II THE PARAMETERS OF HABEAS PROCEEDINGS SET BY
THE D.C. CIRCUIT, AND A REVIEW OF PROCEDURE
SET FOR GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES SET BY
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S 2011 ORDER
Following the decision in Boumediene, the courts in the D.C. Circuit
ﬁrst outlined a standard to ascertain exactly who could be justiﬁably
detained at Guanta´namo. The post-Boumediene decisions draw pri-
marily on the broad language of the Authorization for Use of Mili-
tary Force (‘AUMF’), which enables the President to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those […] persons he deter-
mines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001 […] in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such […] persons’.22 At a minimum, the all necessary and appropriate
force’ language of theAUMF includes the power to capture and detain
those described in the congressional authorization’.23
In Al-Bihani v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit Court stated that the
category of persons subject to detention includes those who are part
of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who pur-
posefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S.
Coalition forces.’24 To meet the threshold showing that a detainee is
part of’ Al Qaeda, it is not necessary to show that an individual
operates within al Qaeda’s formal command structure,’ although such
a showing is suﬃcient to meet this threshold.25 The inquiry should
instead focus upon the actions of the individual in relation to the
organization’ rather than relying on a determination of whether or not
the detainee formally received or executed any orders’ fromAl Qaeda,
the Taliban, or associated forces.26 The D.C. Circuit Court has opined
that the evidence of action must surpass the bare minimum level of
the purely independent conduct of a freelancer’.27 Furthermore, the
22 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
23 Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F 3d 1102, 1103 (DC Cir 2010) (citing Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 519 (2004)).
24 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F 3d 866, 872 (DC Cir 2010) [emphasis added].
25 Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F 3d 718, 725 (DC Cir 2010); Hatim v. Gates 632 F 3d
720, 721 (DC Cir 2011).
26 Uthman v. Obama, 637 F 3d 400, 403 (DC Cir 2011); Salahi v. Obama, 625 F 3d
745, 752 (DC Cir 2010).
27 Bensayah (n 25 above) 725.
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evidence must relate to whether the petitioner was a part of’ an
associated force at the time of capture, rather than focus entirely on
conduct occurring long before the US military took possession of the
detainee.28 Importantly, in the evaluation of whether a detainee
should be continually held, the court should not inquire into [w]he-
ther a detainee would pose a threat to U.S. interests if released’, but
rather whether the hostilities themselves are still continuing.29
Over a course of successive decisions, the D.C. Circuit courts an-
nounced that the Government has the burden of showing in the dis-
trict court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the petitioner’s
continued detention is lawful, and that such a standard is constitu-
tional.30 On appeal, D.C. Circuit panels began summarily dismissing
petitioners’ challenges that alleged a standard of reasonable doubt or
clear and convincing evidence was constitutionally required: [l]est
there be any further misunderstandings, let us be absolutely clear.
A preponderance of the evidence standard satisﬁes constitutional
requirements in considering a habeas petition from a detainee held
pursuant to the AUMF.’31 The opinion in Al-Bihani, which estab-
lished the constitutionality of such a preponderance standard for use
in these cases, explicitly stated, however, that the court’s determina-
tion of constitutionality did not include an endeavor to identify what
standard would represent the minimum required by the Constitu-
tion.’32 The court in Al-Adahi, after brieﬂy reviewing the history of
standards of proof used in habeas petitions, noted that the rationale
for adoption of such a preponderance standard by D.C. Circuit courts
following Boumediene is unstated’, and proﬀered its doubt as to
whether the Suspension Clause requires the use of the preponderance
standard.’33 In Al-Adahi, therefore, the court proceeded with the case
under the assumption, arguendo[,] that the Government must show
by a preponderance of the evidence’ that the petitioner’s detention was
lawful because of his association with Al Qaeda.34
The cases decided in the D.C. Circuit to date have included detailed
analyses of the evidence presented by the Government on whether
28 Salahi (n 26 above) 750-51.
29 Awad v. Obama, 608 F 3d 1, 11 (DC Cir 2010).
30 Odah v. United States, 611 F 3d 8, 13 (DC Cir 2010) (calling such a standard
now well-settled law’).
31 Awad (n 29 above) 11 [emphasis added].
32 Al-Bihani (n 24 above) 878 [emphasis added].
33 Al-Adahi (n 23 above) 1104-05.
34 Ibid., 1105.
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each petitioner was part of’ Al Qaeda. The evidence is to be consid-
ered as a whole, and not in a piecemeal fashion with individual pieces
of evidence viewed in isolation.35 InAl-Adahi, the court, in very strong
language, condemned the district court’s mistaken view that each
item of the government’s evidence’, on its own, needed to prove the
ultimate issue in the case.’36 Speciﬁcally, each piece of evidence must
be examined in the context of the whole of the Government’s pre-
sentation, and not cast aside before conducting an evaluation of the
next individual piece of evidence.37 A ﬁnding that a petitioner was
part of’ Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, signiﬁes that
continued justiﬁcation is lawful, and will lead to district court denial
of the petitioner’s request for the writ of habeas corpus.38 The fol-
lowing non-exhaustive list of factors has been found, by the district
courts and appellate courts on review, to be suggestive of a petitioner’s
being a part of’ such forces. These factors are therefore supportive of
an ultimate conclusion that the requisite standard has been met, when
considered along with other listed factors, and all of the evidence
oﬀered by the Government in its entirety: admissions of travel to
Afghanistan for purposes of ﬁghting U.S. forces39; close connections
with Al Qaeda operatives40; the location of capture,41 especially sig-
niﬁcant if in the vicinity of Tora Bora42 or at a known Al Qaeda
guesthouse43; being captured along with known Taliban ﬁghters or Al
Qaeda operatives44; providing arms training to militia members for
operations against U.S. forces45; receiving military instruction at a
known Al Qaeda or associated terrorist training camp46; illogical or
false explanations for presence in Afghanistan or association with
Taliban or Al Qaeda ﬁghters47; attendance at religious schools known
35 Awad (n 29 above) 7.
36 Al-Adahi (n 23 above) 1111.
37 Salahi (n 26 above) 753.
38 Esmail v. Obama, 639 F 3d 1075, 1075 (DC Cir 2011).
39 See, e.g., Awad (n 29 above) 10.
40 See, e.g., Salahi (n 26 above) 753; Al-Adahi (n 23 above) 1107.
41 See, e.g., Barhoumi v Obama 609 F 3d 416, 432 (DC Cir 2010).
42 See, e.g., Uthman (n 26 above) 404.
43 See, e.g., Barhoumi (n 41 above) 427.
44 See, e.g., Esmail(n 38 above) 1077; Uthman (n 26 above) 405; Al-Adahi
(n 23 above) 1110.
45 See, e.g., Barhoumi (n 41 above) 427.
46 See, e.g., ibid; Esmail (n 38 above) 1076; Odah (n 30 above) 15–16; Al-Adahi
(n 23 above) 1109.
47 See, e.g., Esmail (n 38 above) 1077; Uthman (n 26 above) 405.
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as Al Qaeda recruiting grounds48; traveling along known Al Qaeda
routes to and from Afghanistan49; presence at Al Qaeda guesthouses
during travels50; lack of passport at capture51; following directions of
Al Qaeda or Taliban oﬃcials52; and Al Qaeda documentation listing
member names including the detainee’s, when presented in conjunc-
tion with corroborative testimony from other operatives.53
As for the conduct of the habeas proceedings themselves, the
court, in Al-Bihani, held that the [h]abeas review for Guanta´namo
detainees need not match the procedures developed by Congress and
the courts speciﬁcally for habeas challenges to criminal convic-
tions.’54 Basing their decision on the holding in Boumediene, which
explicitly stated that habeas procedures for detainees need not
resemble a criminal trial,’ the Al-Bihani court held that the courts
reviewing habeas petitions are neither bound by the procedural limits
created for other detention contexts, nor obliged to use them as
baselines from which any departures must be justiﬁed.’55 Therefore,
the Guanta´namo detainees’ habeas proceedings are not subject to all
the protections given to defendants in criminal prosecutions.’56
Recognition of this distinction between normal criminal prosecu-
tions and the habeas petitions of Guanta´namo detainees is especially
important in the context of the admissibility of hearsay at such
proceedings. Al-Bihani established that hearsay is always admissible’
in such proceedings, and that habeas courts must only ask what pro-
bative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits’.57
The court in Awad clariﬁed the end result of such an inquiry, holding
that hearsay evidence is admissible in this type of habeas proceeding if
the hearsay is reliable’.58 A successful challenge to such evidence must
establish, therefore, not that the evidence simply is hearsay, but that it is
unreliable hearsay’.59
48 See, e.g., Uthman (n 26 above) 405.
49 See, e.g., ibid.; Odah (n 30 above) 16.
50 See, e.g., Uthman (n 26 above) 406; Al-Adahi (n 23 above) 1107–08.
51 See, e.g., Uthman (n 26 above) 406.
52 Odah (n 30 above) 15.
53 See, e.g., Awad (n 29 above) 8–9.
54 Al-Bihani (n 24 above) 876 [quotations omitted].
55 Ibid., 876–77.
56 Al-Adahi (n 23 above) 1111, n 6.
57 Al-Bihani (n 24 above) 879.
58 Awad (n 29 above) 7 [emphasis added].
59 Barhoumi (n 41 above) 422.
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The line of cases in the D.C. Circuit also established the varying
standards of review for the pieces comprising the District Court’s
decision. The factual ﬁndings of the District Court are reviewed for
clear error’ regardless of whether they were based on live testimony
or […] documentary evidence’; this standard applies equally to the
inferences drawn’ from such ﬁndings.60 The clear error standard of
review is a high bar to overcome, and the Awad court noted that if the
District Court’s account of the evidence’ is merely plausible in light
of the record viewed in its entirety,’ the appellate court is forbidden
from ordering reversal.61 A permissible view’ of the evidence can
therefore never be clearly erroneous.62 Beyond the standards for
review of the factual records, the appellate courts must review a
district court’s habeas determination de novo, and any challenged
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.’63
These diﬀering standards are especially important in the review of
whether a detainee was part of a force associated with Al Qaeda or the
Taliban, as discussed above. This is a mixed questionof lawand fact.’64
The question of whether a detainee’s alleged conduct […] justiﬁes his
detention under the AUMF is a legal question’ which is therefore re-
viewed de novo; the question of whether the government has proven
that conduct,’ however, is a factual question’ which is reviewed for
clear error under the very diﬃcult standard delineated above.65
On March 7, 2011, President Obama issued the Executive Order
13567, entitled Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at
Guanta´namo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for
Use of Military Force’,66 which applied to those detainees held at
Guanta´namo’ on March 7 who had been either designated for con-
tinued law of war detention’ or referred for prosecution’.67 The
Order continues to apply to such detainees even if they are trans-
ferred from Guanta´namo to another United States detention facil-
ity.68 The Order speciﬁcally excludes those detainees against whom
charges [were] pending’ and against whom a judgment of conviction’
60 Awad (n 29 above) 7.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Barhoumi (n 41 above) 424 (quoting Al-Bihani (n 24 above) 870).
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Exec. Order No 13,567 (2011), 76 Fed Reg 13277 (7 March 2011).
67 Ibid., § 1(a).
68 Ibid., § 1(c).
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had been entered.69 The Order establishes a process to review on a
periodic basis the executive branch’s continued, discretionary exercise
of existing detention authority in individual cases’.70 As such, the
scope of the Order is speciﬁcally limited: it does not create any
additional or separate source of detention authority’, does not aﬀect
the scope of detention authority under existing law’, and, in relation
to Boumediene, does not aﬀect the jurisdiction of Federal courts to
determine the legality of [Guanta´namo detainees’] detention’, or
interfere with their constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.’71 This Order, however, stands in direct contravention of a
previous Order issued by Obama in January of 2009, which ordered
the closure of Guanta´namo’s detention facilities by no later than
January 2010,72 and also demanded an immediate review of the
status of each individual currently detained at Guanta´namo.’73
The 2011 Order’s review procedure sets a baseline standard war-
ranting the continued detention of a detainee that turns on whether it
is necessary to protect against a signiﬁcant threat to the security of
the United States.’74 The Periodic Review process outlined by the
President is to be coordinated by the Secretary of Defense, in con-
junction with the Attorney General, and must be consistent with the
requirements outlined for (a) an initial review; (b) a subsequent full
review; (c) continuing ﬁle reviews; and (d) a ﬁnal review of the
decisions made by the Periodic Review Boards (Boards).75 The
Boards consist of one senior oﬃcial from the Departments of State,
Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, and one oﬃcial repre-
senting the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ.76
The Order requires an initial review for every detainee within one
year of March 7, 2011.69 Prior to the initial review, a detainee must be
provided a written notice of the review, a summary of the facts the
Board will consider in its evaluation, and the reasons outlined by the
government for the detainee’s continued detention.77 During these
69 Ibid., § 1(a).
70 Ibid., § 1(b).
71 Ibid.
72 Exec. Order No. 13,492 (2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898, § 3 (22 January 2009).
73 Ibid., 4898, § 4(a).
74 Exec. Order No. 13,567 (n 66 above) § 2.
75 Ibid., 13277–79, § 3(a)–(d).
76 Ibid., 13280, § 9(b).
77 Ibid., § 3(a)(1).
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proceedings, the detainee shall have the assistance of a government-
provided representative or can retain private counsel78; the detainee,
with counsel, can present a statement, introduce any relevant infor-
mation, answer questions, and call available witnesses with material
information.79 The Secretary of Defense, in opposition to the detai-
nee’s release, shall provide to both the Board and the detainee’s
representative all information […] relevant to the determination’ on
whether the detainee meets the baseline standard described above,
which includes all mitigating information.’80 The information pro-
vided to counsel may, on determination by the Board, be provided in
the form of a substitute or summary in order to protect national
security […] intelligence sources and methods.’81 Following the
hearing, the Board shall make a prompt determination, by consensus
and in writing, as to whether the detainee’s continued detention is
warranted’ based on the above standard which must be provided to
the detainee within 30 days.82
Beyond the initial review, the Order establishes a subsequent full
review’ and hearings by the Board every three years using the same
procedures outlined above.83 In the interim between full reviews, each
detainee’s continued detention is subject to a ﬁle review’ every six
months, conducted by the Board, consisting of a review of any rel-
evant new information’ compiled by the Secretary of Defense.84 At
each ﬁle review, the detainee can make his own submission: if a
signiﬁcant question’ is raised as to whether the detainee’s continued
detention is warranted’, the Board will promptly convene a full
review’ consistent with the above procedures.85 Finally, a Review
Committee conducts a Board review’ if a Committee member so
seeks within 30 days, or the Board cannot reach an initial consen-
sus.86
The failure of the Board to determine that a detainee meets the
baseline standard requires the Secretaries of State and Defense to use
vigorous eﬀorts’ to identify a suitable transfer location […] outside
78 Ibid., 13278 § 3(a)(2).
79 Ibid., § 3(a)(3).
80 Ibid., § 3(a)(4)-(5).
81 Ibid., 13279, § 5.
82 Ibid., 13278, § 3(a)(7).
83 Ibid., 13279, § 3(b).
84 Ibid., § 3(c).
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., § 3(d).
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of the United States’ that is consistent with [US] national security
and foreign policy interests’.87 A Committee is then in charge of
reviewing, on an annual basis, the status of transfer eﬀorts’ for those
detainees needing transfer after a Periodic Review, in addition to the
transfer eﬀorts for detainees granted a writ of habeas corpus from a
federal court.88 The Order, and transfer process, is to be implemented
in accordance with laws relating to the transfer, treatment, and
interrogation of individuals detained in an armed conﬂict’, including
the Convention against Torture.89
President Obama made a campaign pledge to close Guanta´namo
by January 2010, returning as many detainees as advisable to their
states.90 Through US Attorney General Holder, the administration
proposed trying some detainees in federal court in New York and
others in military commissions at Guanta´namo, with the possibility
of adapting a Thomson, Illinois prison for the detainees.91 Congress
responded by seeking to bar transfer of detainees to the US for
prosecution and resisting funding for the Illinois prison (with some
Democrats insisting on trials and some Republicans opposed to any
imprisonment in the United States).92 The New York mayor and
others resisted trials in New York City; while the American Civil
Liberties Union (‘ACLU’) and others insisted on trials, not com-
mission proceedings.93 Complicating matters even more, the Christ-
mas Day 2010 attempted airplane bombing by a Yemeni suspended
all transfers of Guanta´namo detainees to Yemen.94
87 Ibid., § 4.
88 Ibid., § 5(a)(1)–(2).
89 Ibid., § 10(b).
90 Obama: We Are Going to Close Gitmo’ (CBSNews, 11 January 2009)http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/11/national/main4713038.shtml accessed 23 May
2012.
91 J.Dienst and H. Gittens, 9/11 Terror Trials Will not be Held in New York City’
(NBCNewYork, 30 January 2010) http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/911-
Terror-Trials-Will-Not-Be-Held-in-NYC-83083662.html accessed 23 May 2012.
92 S. Dinan, House Acts to Block Closing of Gitmo’ Washington Times
(Washington D.C., 8 December 2010) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/
dec/8/congress-deals-death-blow-gitmo-closure/?page=all accessed 23 May 2012.
93 Dienst (n 91 above).
94 C. Fowler, Bombs Sent from Yemen Raise Questions About Guanta´namo
Detainees’ (National Security Law Brief, 3 November 2010) http://nationalsecurity
lawbrief.com/2010/11/03/bombs-sent-from-yemen-raise-question-about-guanta´namo-
detainees accessed 24 May 2012.
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III THE TORTURE POLICY OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRA-
TION AND WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR MILITARY
COMMISSIONS
President Bush transferred 537 detainees.95 How many reverted to
terrorist activities? As of October 2010, 81 were conﬁrmed’ and 69
suspected’ of terrorist or insurgent activities of the 598 detainees
transferred.96 President Obama has transferred 69 including more
than a dozen in Europe.97 Where to return, or where and how to try
the remaining detainees? As of April 2012, approximately 169 of the
779 detainees are remaining.98 According to a January 22, 2010,
Justice (State, Homeland Security, Department of Defense, Justice,
CIA, and FBI oﬃcials) Task Force Report, 97 of the 240 who might
be released were Yemeni.99 Of those, 36 were eligible for immediate
release; and another 30 would be eligible when Yemen is suﬃciently
stable.100 According to the same report, 44 detainees were referred for
prosecution in federal courts or commissions.101 Most problematic,
there are approximately 48 to be held indeﬁnitely due to evaluations
that they are too dangerous to release but for whom there is insuf-
ﬁcient admissible evidence for a commission proceeding, according to
Guanta´namo documents leaked in April of 2010.102
Experienced military interrogators are among the ﬁrst to say that
torture is often counterproductive, unproductive in terms of reliable
information, and unnecessary despite all the ticking time-bomb’
95 Guanta´namo Bay Detainees’ (GlobalSecurity.Org) http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_detainees.htm accessed 23 May 2012.
96 Ibid.
97 J. Tapper, First Gitmo Detainees in More than a Year Transferred; Uighur
Detainees Bound for El Salvador’ (ABC News, 20 April 2012) http://abcnews.go.
com/blogs/politics/2012/04/ﬁrst-gitmo-detainees-in-more-than-a-year-transferred/
accessed 22 May 2012.
98 C. Savage, W. Glaberson, & A. W. Lehren, The Guanta´namo Files: Glimpses
of Lives in an American Limbo’ New York Times (New York, 24 April 2011)
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/guantanamo-ﬁles-lives-in-an-american-
limbo.html?pagewanted=all accessed 23 May 2012.
99 Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State, Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, Oﬃce of the Director of National Intelligence, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ, Guanta´namo Review Task Force, Final Report (22 January
2010) ii http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-ﬁnal-report.pdf accessed 23
May 2012.
100 Ibid., 25.
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scenarios used in its justiﬁcation. Much of this is a matter of common
sense. How many of us would confess to virtually anything if sub-
jected to torture on a daily basis? Many of these detainees are not
reticent to assume responsibility for their crimes, and, in their
fanaticism, are proud to admit to them. Among many other military
heroes, General Fred Haynes, a young captain with the US Marines
Combat Team 28 at the battle of Iwo Jima, speaks convincingly
against the use of torture, describing how humanitarian treatment of
Japanese prisoners in one of the most harrowing ordeals imaginable
led to their cooperation in providing valuable information to their US
captors.103 What is the cost for torture of these high-value’ detainees?
Obviously, it provided propaganda to our enemies, prompted prob-
lems and often disappointment from our allies, and tarnished a tra-
dition of democratic and humanitarian ideals dearly paid for by those
who have served so admirably and humanely in our military. There is
also the legal cost. One of the most fundamental tenets of our con-
stitutional law system and humanitarian law is that statements ob-
tained by torture are inadmissible for any purpose. No judge, whether
in a military commission or a federal trial, can convict on the basis of
evidence obtained through torture. The bottom line is that the very
terrorists who should have been treated the most cautiously by
experienced military interrogators to satisfy unavoidable evidentiary
requirements were not so treated, despite the substantial likelihood
that evidence against them and others could have been otherwise
obtained. As a practical matter, prosecutors, whether before the
commissions or federal court, found themselves in the diﬃcult posi-
tion of being unable to rely on admissions that might have been
otherwise obtained, and were required to ﬁnd new evidence untainted
by the coerced admissions.
So, in 2012, justice has begun for the victims of 9/11, as well as the
victims of the Cole bombing in 2000. The proceedings are taking
place in the only place they can be held, and in the only form they can
be held, due to Congressional restrictions on any detainee even being
brought into the US Some commentators, including notably John
Yoo, one of the architects of the prior administration’s torture policy,
have said the decision to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is an implicit
103 Retired Military Generals Criticize President Bush for Preparing to Veto Anti-
Torture Bill’ (Democracy Now, 6 March 2008) http://www.democracynow.org/
2008/3/6/retired_generals_criticize_president_bush_for accessed 23 May 2012.
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confession’ by the Obama administration that military commissions
are the best balance of security needs and protections for liberty.’104
A forced decision is not an implicit admission any more than a
statement obtained through torture is a reliable admission of guilt.
Whether a Guanta´namo military commission is the best option or
not, it is for the foreseeable future the only option provided by
Congress. If Khalid Sheikh Mohammed can be convicted by a mili-
tary commission, it will be a testament to the dedication of many
unrecognized military investigators and lawyers seeking to undo the
damage done from a policy of torture, with admissible evidence of
guilt.
104 J. Yoo, Breaking: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to be Tried by Military Com-
mission at Guanta´namo’ (Richochet, 4 April 2011) http://ricochet.com/main-feed/
Breaking-Khalid-Sheikh-Mohammed-to-Be-Tried-by-Military-Commission-at-
Guantanamo accessed 23 May 2012.
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